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OF COLORED PEOPLE - PITTSBURGH BRANCH, 
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and on behalf of all others similarly situated; 
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SOUTHWESTERN PENNSYLVANIA COUNCIL OF CHAPTERS, 
individually and on behalf of its members and 
on behalf of all others similarly situated and 
DONALD ALLEN; BENJAMIN ASHE; JEROME AZIZ; 
RICHARD HURT; ADAM KINSEL; LYNWOOD SCOTT and 
RICHARD STEWART, individually and on behalf 
of all others similarly situated; 
J. TERESE DOYLE, individually and on behalf 
of all others similarly situated; 
CHERYL EDMONDS; ROSE MITCHUM; LINDA ROBINSON; 
JOANNE ROWE; DEBORAH SMITH and GLORIA VANDA, 
individually and on behalf of all 
others similarly situated; 
HARVEY ADAMS; MACK HENDERSON; THEODORE SAULSBURY and 
CHARLES TARRANT, individually and on behalf 
of all others similarly situated;  
GLADYS SMITH, Individually and on behalf  
of all others similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
PETER F. FLAHERTY, Mayor of the City of Pittsburgh 
and Acting Director of the Department of 
Public Safety of the City of Pittsburgh; 
ROBERT J. COLL, Superintendent of the City of 
Pittsburgh Bureau of Police; 
STEPHEN A. GLICKMAN, President of the 
City of Pittsburgh Civil Service Commission; 
ALBERT STATTI and EDWARD L. ENGLISH, 
Members of the City of Pittsburgh Civil Service Commission; 
MELANIE J. SMITH, Secretary and Chief Examiner 
of the City of Pittsburgh Civil Service Commission; and 
CITY OF PITTSBURGH, all individually and 
in their official capacities 
  
 
v. 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE 
 
(Intervenor in D.C.) 
 
      (D.C. Civil No. 75-162) 
 
MICHAEL C. SLATER 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PITTSBURGH, a municipal corporation 
 
      (D.C. Civil No. 90-457) 
 
CHARLES H. BOEHM; PAUL G. CLARK and 
RICHARD USNER, on behalf of themselves 
and all others similarly situated 
 
v. 
 
SOPHIE MASLOFF, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF PITTSBURGH; 
MELANIE J. SMITH, DIRECTOR OF PERSONNEL OF THE 
CITY OF PITTSBURGH; THE PITTSBURGH CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION and THE CITY OF PITTSBURGH 
 
      (D.C. Civil No. 90-629) 
 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant 
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COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the original plaintiff in 
this matter, appeals from the order of the district court 
awarding attorney's fees against it pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
or, alternatively, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
41(b).  Because the lawsuit filed by the Commonwealth was not 
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation and because the 
Commonwealth did not fail to prosecute its case, we will reverse 
the award of attorney's fees against the Commonwealth. 
  
 I. Factual and Procedural Background 
 In 1975, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ("Commonwealth") 
filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 against the City of 
Pittsburgh ("City") alleging, inter alia, discrimination in the 
hiring of minority applicants by the Police Department of the 
City of Pittsburgh.  Following a hearing the district court made 
findings that the City had virtually eliminated the hiring of 
minority applicants as police officers.  The district court 
entered a preliminary injunction requiring the City to hire one 
white female, one African-American male, and one African-American 
female for every white male that it hired.  The City did not 
appeal from the preliminary injunction order. 
 In 1977, the Fraternal Order of Police, an intervening 
defendant, moved to dissolve the injunction.  The application was 
  
denied by the district court because the Fraternal Order of 
Police lacked standing.  In 1984, a white male applicant who had 
continually applied for a position as a Pittsburgh police officer 
since 1975 moved to intervene in this action in order to 
challenge the preliminary injunction.  The district court denied 
the application, and we affirmed the order of the district court.  
Finally, in 1990, Paul Clark, Richard Usner, Michael Benner, and 
Daniel Dulski ("intervening defendants"), white male applicants, 
filed two separate complaints against the City of Pittsburgh and 
its officials challenging the hiring system imposed by the 
preliminary injunction.  The district court consolidated the 
cases thereby making these parties intervening defendants to the 
original suit between the Commonwealth and the City.   
 In March of 1991 the district court granted the intervening 
defendants' motion to dissolve the injunction and denied the 
intervening defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute.  The Commonwealth appealed the dissolution of the 
injunction to this Court.  We dismissed the appeal as moot when 
the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of 
the intervening defendants on the claim of discrimination in the 
hiring of police officers.  
 The district court also granted intervening defendants' 
petitions for attorney's fees incurred in obtaining the 
dissolution of the injunction, assessing 75% of the fees against 
the plaintiff Commonwealth and 25% against the defendant City of 
Pittsburgh.  In making this award of attorney's fees, the 
district court realigned the parties.  The intervening defendants 
  
were treated as plaintiffs and the plaintiff Commonwealth and 
defendant City were deemed defendants for the purpose of awarding 
fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  Commonwealth v. Flaherty, Nos. 75-
162, 90-457, 90-629, slip op. at 15 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1991). 
 The order granting the intervening defendants' motion for 
summary judgment and denying their motion to dismiss the original 
complaint for failure of the Commonwealth to prosecute was 
affirmed on appeal.  The appeal of the attorney's fees award was 
dismissed because the fee award had not been quantified and 
therefore was not a final order.  Commonwealth v. Flaherty, 983 
F.2d 1267, 1277 (3d Cir. 1993).  Subsequently, the district court 
quantified the attorney's fees requested by the intervening 
defendants at $ 80,000.00, and the Commonwealth was required to 
pay 75%, or $ 60,000.00.  The City was ordered to pay 25%, or 
$20,000.00.  Flaherty, slip op. at 3-4 (March 17, 1994).  
Although the City has entered an appearance in this appeal, it 
has not filed a brief nor sought oral argument.  This appeal by 
the Commonwealth followed.  
  
 II. Discussion 
 
 A.  Award of Attorney's Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 
 The district court awarded $ 60,000.00 in attorney's fees in 
favor of the intervening defendants and against the Commonwealth.  
This Court has previously stated that, "[w]e must defer to the 
district court's fee determination unless it has erred legally, 
or the facts on which the determination rests are clearly 
  
erroneous."  Quiroga v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 502 (3d 
Cir.)(citations omitted), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 
376 (1991).  We conclude that the district court erred as a 
matter of law in realigning the parties, thus failing to apply 
the rule that fees cannot be awarded against a plaintiff absent a 
finding that the suit was frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation. 
   The general rule in the United States is that absent 
legislation to the contrary, litigants must bear their own 
attorney's fees.  See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness 
Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95 S. Ct. 1612, 1616 (1975).  The 
statutory authority for awarding attorney's fees in § 1983 cases 
is set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).  That section provides, 
"[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 
1981 . . . [or] 1983 . . .  of this title . . . the court, in its 
discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable 
attorney's fee as part of the costs."  42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1988 
& Supp. V 1993).  The standard to be used in determining whether 
a request for attorney's fees by a prevailing defendant should be 
approved is set forth in Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 
U.S. 412, 98 S. Ct. 694 (1978).  In that case, the Supreme Court 
held that "a district court may in its discretion award 
attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case 
upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in 
subjective bad faith."  Id. at 421, 98 S. Ct. at 700.  Although 
Christiansburg Garment dealt with Title VII fee awards, the 
  
Supreme Court has subsequently indicated that "[t]he legislative 
history of § 1988 indicates that Congress intended that `the 
standards for awarding fees be generally the same as under the 
fee provisions [contained in Title VII] of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act.'"  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7, 103 S. Ct. 
1933, 1939 n.7 (1983).  Thus, the analysis adopted by 
Christiansburg Garment in determining whether to award attorney's 
fees to a prevailing party is equally applicable to the matter 
before us. 
 In Christiansburg Garment, the prevailing party was a 
defendant, whereas in the case at bar the prevailing parties are 
intervening defendants.   The question whether an intervening 
defendant may also be considered a prevailing party entitled to 
an award of attorney's fees is not free from doubt.  We are 
prepared to assume, arguendo, that the answer is in the 
affirmative.  See Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240, 245-249 
(D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1204, 103 S. Ct. 1190 
(1983).  However, for the reasons given in Donnell, we would 
think that such an award would be justified only where the 
intervening defendant had clearly made a substantial contribution 
to the successful result.  And, in any event, the district 
court's discretionary award of attorney's fees would be justified 
only in those situations where, under the Christiansburg Garment 
standard, the plaintiff's "claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or 
groundless, or [when] the plaintiff continued to litigate after 
it clearly became so."  434 U.S. at 422, 98 S. Ct. at 701. 
           
  
      Plaintiff argues that the award of attorney's fees by the 
district court in favor of the intervenors and against the 
plaintiff is erroneous as a matter of law because it is contrary 
to controlling Supreme Court precedent.  In the case at bar, the 
district court did not arrive at its decision to award attorney's 
fees by applying the standard as set forth in Christiansburg 
Garment above.  Rather, the district court stated: 
 To award attorney fees to a prevailing intervenor 
against a civil rights plaintiff . . . would appear to 
penalize a plaintiff without a finding that his or her 
claim was frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.  We 
found, however, that doing so in this case would 
further the underlying purpose behind awarding attorney 
fees in civil rights actions . . . . 
 
Flaherty, slip op. at 4 (August 23, 1993) (citing Flaherty, slip 
op. at 13, 17 (Sept. 9, 1991)).  The district court acknowledged 
that it never made findings that the plaintiff's claim was 
frivolous, unreasonable or groundless.  Instead, the district 
court reasoned that it would be proper to realign the parties and 
treat the Commonwealth as a defendant for fee award purposes 
because it would further the congressional goal of attacking 
discrimination by encouraging civil rights lawsuits.  Flaherty, 
slip op. at 17 (Sept. 9, 1991). 
 The district court decided to treat both the City as well as 
the Commonwealth as civil rights defendants because both entities 
assumed identical postures when they allowed the injunction to 
exist indefinitely and left in place discriminatory hiring 
practices pursuant to what intervening defendants characterized 
as an unconstitutional quota system.  Flaherty, slip op. at 15 
  
(Sept. 9, 1991).  Additionally, the district court concluded that 
the plaintiff Commonwealth assumed characteristics of a defendant 
by opposing the intervention of other parties.  Id.  We see no 
reason for the Commonwealth to be realigned as a defendant.  The 
status of the Commonwealth as a plaintiff seeking a civil rights 
remedy was not diminished or changed simply by reason of its not 
seeking to obtain a permanent injunction after a preliminary 
injunction had been granted, nor by its objecting to the 
intervention of other parties. 
 While it is true that awarding attorney's fees to prevailing 
intervening defendants will undoubtedly encourage some civil 
rights lawsuits, we believe that the analysis undertaken by the 
district court fails to adequately account for the detriment 
caused by awarding attorney's fees against plaintiffs whose 
claims are not frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.  To accept 
the reasoning of the district court would require us to expand 
the rule of Christiansburg Garment to allow the award of 
attorney's fees to defendants in cases even where a plaintiff's 
claim is meritorious.  Intervening defendants advocate a rule 
that would award attorney's fees against a plaintiff who, in the 
context of a preliminary or permanent injunction, succeeds on the 
merits, but then fails to notify the court when the injunction 
may no longer be valid as a result of a change in the law.  We 
cannot accept such an award structure. 
 Intervening defendants' sole argument is that absent an 
award of attorney's fees, civil rights suits will be chilled 
because similarly situated potential intervenors will not 
  
initiate court proceedings.  We do not believe there is force in 
such an argument.  Potential intervenors will continue to 
initiate court proceedings because the intervenor will always be 
in a position to seek attorney's fees from the defendant who is 
unsuccessful.  Additionally, under the intervening defendants' 
scheme, any gains which may be achieved by awarding fees to 
intervening defendants might be eroded by the chilling effect 
that such a rule of law would have on potential plaintiffs.  The 
uncertainty created by such a rule might discourage some 
plaintiffs from filing suit for fear that even if they initially 
prevail in the lawsuit, they may ultimately be liable for 
attorney's fees.  The most efficient way to balance the competing 
concerns of encouraging potential intervenors to intervene and 
simultaneously not discouraging plaintiffs from filing suit in 
the first instance is to continue to take advantage of the fee 
award structure that already exists, namely to award fees to the 
prevailing party and against the losing defendant. 
 In this case, the City of Pittsburgh failed to challenge a 
legally questionable preliminary injunction, and allowed it to 
remain in effect for over fifteen years.  If the district court 
in the first instance had ordered the City of Pittsburgh to pay 
100% of the attorney's fees, then the dual purposes of 
encouraging civil rights litigation by intervenors yet not 
chilling a plaintiff from filing suit would have been served.  As 
the district court noted, "[r]equiring the original plaintiff in 
a civil rights action to pay a portion of the Intervenors' 
attorney fees is, perhaps, unprecedented."  Flaherty, slip op. at 
  
7 (August 23, 1993).  We decline to expand the rule of 
Christiansburg Garment and create such precedent.  A prevailing 
party may still only recover against a plaintiff in a civil 
rights suit where plaintiff's suit is frivolous, unreasonable, or 
groundless.       
 
 B.  Award of Attorney's Fees as an Alternative to Dismissal 
 Under Federal Rule Of Civil Procedure 41(b) 
 The district court also held that an award of attorney's 
fees was justified as an alternative sanction to dismissing the 
case for failure to prosecute.  Accordingly, although we find 
that the award of attorney's fees was not proper under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988, we must also consider whether an award is appropriate as 
an alternative to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
41(b).  Our review of the district court's fee award, where no 
facts are in dispute, is plenary.  Quiroga, 934 F.2d at 502. 
 The Commonwealth argues that nothing in the language of Rule 
41(b) provides for an award of attorney's fees as an appropriate 
alternative to dismissing a case.  Although a district court may 
impose attorney's fees as a sanction under its inherent power, 
see Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765-66, 100 S. 
Ct. 2455, 2463-64 (1980), there must be some factual predicate 
which would indicate that the plaintiff was less than diligent in 
either prosecuting its case or complying with a court order.  See 
Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 869 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (award of attorney's fees would be proper in light of 
dilatoriness of plaintiff's counsel).  We must thus decide 
  
whether the district court erred in finding this sanction 
appropriate. 
 In support of its alternative justification for awarding 
attorney's fees, the district court noted the following concerns:  
(1) the Commonwealth's failure to prosecute the action and seek a 
final adjudication on the merits in light of new Supreme Court 
precedent, thus allowing what had become a legally questionable 
preliminary injunction to remain the status quo for over fifteen 
years; and (2) the Commonwealth's failure to urge the district 
court to review the City's efforts at eliminating discriminatory 
hiring practices.  Flaherty, slip op. at 14-15 (September 9, 
1991).  Thus, from the record before us, it appears that the 
district court pointed to the exact same conduct of the 
Commonwealth when awarding attorney's fees under Rule 41(b) as it 
did when awarding attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.   
 We cannot conclude that the Commonwealth's conduct was 
dilatory or an exercise of bad faith.  First, we do not think it 
a prudent rule to require a plaintiff who prevails on a 
preliminary injunction matter to run to the courthouse every time 
he or she suspects that the legal support for the injunction may 
have been undermined by recent caselaw.  Second, the City, rather 
than the Commonwealth, would have been the appropriate entity to 
petition the district court to review the police department's 
attempts to eliminate its discriminatory hiring practices. 
 Because the Commonwealth was not legally accountable for 
allowing the preliminary injunction to remain in place in excess 
of fifteen years, there is no justification based on the 
  
undisputed facts in the record for awarding attorney's fees as an 
alternative to dismissal.  The district court erred as a matter 
of law in awarding attorney's fees as an alternative to dismissal 
under Rule 41(b).     
 
 III. Conclusion 
 We will reverse the district court's award of attorney's 
fees in favor of the intervening defendants and against the 
plaintiff Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  The district court erred 
in awarding attorney's fees against a plaintiff in a civil rights 
suit without finding that the plaintiff's suit was frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation.  The district court also 
erred by realigning the plaintiff Commonwealth as a civil rights 
defendant for the purpose of awarding attorney's fees.  In 
addition, the facts of this case do not warrant an award of 
attorney's fees against the plaintiff as an alternative to a Rule 
41(b) dismissal.   
_____________________________ 
 
